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or 53 percent above normal expected flow. Following rating changes, we find economically and statistically
significant abnormal flow in the expected direction, positive for rating upgrades and negative for rating
downgrades.  Furthermore, we observe an immediate flow response, suggesting that some investors vigilantly
monitor this information and view the rating change as “new” information on fund quality.  Overall, our results
indicate that Morningstar ratings have unique power to affect asset flow.
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“[T]he brand that has emerged as dominant in the 1990s is not Fidelity, Putnam or even Merrill 
Lynch—but instead is Morningstar.”   
          - R. Pozen, The Mutual Fund Business, 1998, p. 75 
I.  Introduction 
A casual reading of the business press and mutual fund advertisements gives the 
impression that Morningstar, Inc., the Chicago-based rating agency, is highly influential with 
investors.  As support for this claim, most publications cite the statistic that equity mutual funds 
rated with four or five stars by Morningstar have received 80%–100% of all net inflows.
1  
Several recent academic studies motivate their analysis with the argument that Morningstar is the 
“most popular” and “best-known” ranking service among investors.
2  However, we currently 
have little empirical evidence that investors actually use Morningstar ratings in their decision-
making.  The literature relating fund flow to performance presents some cross-sectional evidence 
on this question, but inferring a causal relation between flow and star ratings is problematic 
because of the existence of other contemporaneous influences.
3  This paper employs a more 
powerful time-series event study of rating changes to better isolate a causal relation, if one exists, 
between Morningstar ratings and fund flow.  From this we uncover insights into how investors 
use fund quality information that are not possible using a cross-sectional analysis.  
The stated goal of several studies in the flow-performance literature is to better 
understand how mutual fund investors make purchase and redemption decisions.  The typical 
approach is to relate flow and performance via cross-sectional analysis (often over multiple 
years), and infer that the performance measures significantly related to fund flow are the ones 
                                                 
1 Some version of this statistic, attributed to a study by Financial Research Corporation has appeared in The Wall 
Street Journal (“Morningstar edges toward one-year ratings” 4/5/96, p C1), Business Week (“One good turnaround 
deserves…” 8/25/97 p. 154), The Economist (“A Survey of Fund Management” 10/25/97 p. 22), Sharpe (1998), 
Morey (2000), and Blake and Morey (2000). 
2 Blume (1998), Sharpe (1998), and Morey (2000) scrutinize Morningstar’s rating algorithm, while Blake and 




that investors use to allocate money among mutual funds.  A common result in this literature is 
that several performance measures are simultaneously significantly related to flow.  For example, 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) report that mutual fund flow is significantly related to both raw return 
and one-factor alpha in multivariate specifications.  Gruber (1996) reports a similar result, 
finding both raw returns and four-factor alphas to be significant.  These authors acknowledge, 
however, that the correlation among performance measures makes it difficult to decipher how 
investors actually use this information. 
We argue that a time-series approach provides new insights into investor decision-
making, because one can observe and isolate investor response to a change in the “quality” of the 
fund.  A Morningstar star rating represents a very specific and observable packaging of 
information on fund quality that arrives monthly.  The discrete nature of Morningstar’s one- to 
five-star ranking system, and the wide-availability of the rating at low cost to investors, implies 
that a rating change is an unambiguous and easily observable quality signal to fund investors.  
These inherent features of a star rating make them particularly well suited to the application of 
event study methods. 
As traditionally designed, an event study is a powerful method to disentangle the 
influence of the star rating itself from other factors that influence fund flow.  Benchmarking each 
fund’s flow against its expected flow isolates the influence of the star rating change, from the 
underlying return performance that led to it.  In addition, the aggregation of many funds in event 
rather than calendar time averages out any idiosyncratic influences on fund flow.  Thus, 
measuring the flow response to a change in Morningstar rating provides a more precise picture of 
how investors respond to new information on fund quality, including how quickly they respond. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 For example, Del Guercio and Tkac (2001) and Bergstresser and Poterba (2001) find that Morningstar star ratings 




In contrast, investor response to other fund quality measures studied in the flow-
performance literature, such as Jensen’s alpha, is much more difficult to assess because of 
complicating measurement issues.  For example, one could test whether a change in Jensen’s 
alpha is followed by a flow response, but that represents the joint hypothesis of whether investors 
respond to changes in alpha, and whether we have observed the same quality signal as investors.  
Because alpha is a continuous variable, it is not at all obvious what magnitude of change in alpha 
is large enough to offset decision and transactions costs and therefore induce investors to 
reallocate assets.  Furthermore, it is not obvious how often investors seek updated information on 
alpha, and therefore whether we should expect changes at weekly, monthly, or some other 
frequency to generate a flow response.  For these reasons, event study methods are less 
appropriate for these more traditional performance measures, as we do not have a well-defined 
“event” to study.  
In a sense, using published star ratings eliminates the joint hypothesis problem because 
we observe the same quality signal that investors see.  Thus, testing for a flow response amounts 
to testing whether investors use star ratings, without having to make assumptions about how they 
use them.  This method also allows us to address broader questions such as:  At what frequency 
is a flow response to new fund information detectable?  Do investors respond symmetrically to 
positive and negative information on fund quality?   
We use monthly data on 3,388 domestic equity mutual funds over the period November 
1996 to October 1999, and identify over 12,000 rating change events.  We test for evidence of 
abnormal flow around changes in Morningstar ratings as well as rating initiations, when 
Morningstar rates a fund for the first time upon reaching its three-year anniversary of inception.  




some funds.  The initiation of a 5-star rating results in average abnormal flow of $26 million, or 
53% above normal expected flow for these funds, over the six months following the initial 
rating.  We find that the strong positive flow response is unique to funds earning an initial 5-star 
rating.  The fact that 1- to 4-star initiations do not generate a positive flow response suggests that 
Morningstar ratings do not have “marquee” value in and of themselves.   
Our analysis of rating changes indicates that investors value the packaging of fund 
quality information that a star rating provides, and view the rating change as “new” information.  
Specifically, we find significant positive responses to rating upgrades, and negative responses to 
rating downgrades, typically ranging from 15-35% of normal flow.  Consistent with the results 
for initiations, an upgrade from 4- to 5-stars has the largest effect on flow in the 6 months 
following the upgrade, resulting in $44 million in abnormal flow, or 35% above normal expected 
flow.  In contrast, a downgrade from 5- to 4-stars has a much smaller impact of only -$8 million 
in abnormal flow, suggesting that the flow response to a downgrade from 5-star status is not 
symmetric to an upgrade to 5-stars. 
Most of the observed flow responses are significant beginning in event month 0, 
indicating that investor response is detectable at the same monthly frequency that Morningstar 
releases new information.  This is a new finding regarding the timeliness of investor response, as 
most previous studies relating flow and performance use annual cross-sections of funds.  Overall, 
our results contribute to a better overall understanding of how mutual fund investors use 
information in their financial decision-making. 
Our findings also have implications for studies of portfolio manager incentives and 
behavior, such as Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997).  Because 




primary concern.  Managers therefore have an incentive to focus their efforts on delivering the 
dimension of performance that results in increased flow, whether it is high returns, high alphas, 
or 5-star ratings.  Viewed in this context, the marginal impact of an additional star on fund flow 
provides a measure of their potential influence on managerial behavior.  Insights from our 
detailed time-series analysis of monthly flow response set the stage for more specific tests to 
identify managerial behaviors, such as the risk-shifting incentive studied in the literature. 
 
II. Data  
A.  Background on Morningstar’s Star Rating 
Morningstar first offered its star ratings in 1986 by subscription to its print product 
Morningstar Mutual Funds and currently offers them free on its website.  Morningstar covers 
virtually all funds in existence and calculates star ratings for all funds that are at least three years 
old.  Star ratings are recomputed monthly and available on Morningstar’s website approximately 
three business days after month-end.  Below we briefly describe the rating process, but interested 
readers should see Blume (1998) and Sharpe (1997, 1998) for a thorough description of 
Morningstar’s rating algorithm.  
A fund’s Morningstar star rating is based on its historical performance with respect to 
both return and risk relative to its peer group.  Specifically, Morningstar uses 36 months of load-
adjusted returns to compute a three-year risk-adjusted rating for each fund.  For each of four 
mutually exclusive peer groups (domestic equity, international equity, taxable bond, and 
municipal bond), it then ranks funds according to this three-year risk-adjusted rating.  A three-
year star rating is assigned for each peer group based on this ranking.  Specifically, funds with 




receive four stars, the next 35% receive three stars, the next 22.5% receive two stars, while the 
bottom 10% of funds in each peer group receive one star.  Morningstar computes a five-year and 
ten-year star rating in the same way, with the only difference being the number of months of 
load-adjusted returns used in the calculations.  The overall star rating is computed as a weighted 
average of these ratings.
4  For funds too young to have a five- and ten-year rating, its overall 
rating is equal to its three-year rating.  This rule apparently applies to the majority of funds, as 
Sharpe (1997) reports that overall star ratings coincide with three-year star ratings for 72.2% of 
domestic equity funds at the end of 1996.  In this study we analyze the overall star rating because 
this appears to be the most widely used and cited among publications geared to investors.
5 
 
B.  Description of our Sample 
We obtain a spreadsheet containing fund names and a monthly time-series of Morningstar 
overall star ratings from November 1996 to October 1999 directly from Morningstar, Inc.  These 
data include star rating histories of all funds in Morningstar’s domestic equity star rating 
category as of October 1999.  In other words, to be included in this database the fund must exist 
and have a star rating as of October 1999.  Because of the high rate of liquidation and mergers in 
the fund industry over this sample period, survivorship bias is a legitimate concern.  Therefore, 
through the use of monthly editions of Morningstar’s CD-ROM Principia product, we fill in star 
ratings for all of the funds that disappeared over this period, totaling 4,040 fund-months.  To 
match the rest of the sample, we only include dead funds if they were old enough to have a star 
rating by October 1999.  We supplement fund ratings with data on returns, total net assets, and 
                                                                 
4 For example, for a fund at least 10 years old, its overall star rating equals 0.2 times its three-year rating, plus 0.3 
times its five-year rating, plus 0.5 times its ten-year rating. 
5 In support of this, we collected information on all mutual fund advertisements that appeared during the month of 




other fund characteristics from the 1999 Survivor-bias Free Mutual Fund Database from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  We perform numerous checks to ensure that the 
data from the two sources are properly linked.
6  Finally, we delete all fund-months that coincide 
with a fund merger since the fund flow numbers are likely to be distorted.  Our final dataset 
contains 111,715 fund-months from 3,388 distinct funds.
7 
Since our goal is to measure the response of mutual fund investors to a change in a fund’s 
Morningstar rating, it is important that the ratings we study reflect information available to 
investors at that time.  Morningstar’s master data file contains historical star ratings for each fund 
that reflect the rating algorithm currently in place, rather than the one in place at that time.  
Consequently, our analysis begins in November 1996 because Morningstar rewrote their master 
file when they changed their algorithm in October to exclude international funds from the 
domestic equity rating category peer group. 
We confirm that the ratings data we use match those available to investors by comparing 
our star ratings to those on the original CD-ROM at two points in time, July 1997 and October 
1999.  Only 2.3% of the funds with a star rating for July 1997 in our data could not be found on 
the original CD-ROM, indicating that backfilling is not a concern.  We also find that only 103, or 
4.5% of the funds, have different star ratings listed in the two sources in July 1997.  In October 
1999, we find no discrepancies in star ratings between the two sources.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
ads that advertised a Morningstar rating, 43, or 100% of them included the overall rating. Of these 43, 37 were for 
domestic equity funds. 
6 We are grateful to Morningstar for providing a spreadsheet with fund name and a monthly time-series of total net 
assets.  These data were invaluable in properly linking the two data sources.  There are 173 funds on the spreadsheet 
from Morningstar that we could not identify as existing on the CRSP database.  An additional 4,406 fund-months 
dropped out because CRSP lacked data on an important variable for our analysis (e.g., total net assets). 
7 We consider a share class (e.g., class A) of a fund to be a unique fund for two reasons. First, Morningstar treats 
each share class independently for the purpose of assigning a star rating. In fact, we commonly observe that a star 
rating differs between classes of the same underlying fund. Second, since our main interest is in flow measurement, 
it is not obvious that flows of different classes are closely related. For this reason, we are not double-counting 




C.  Timing and Measurement of Fund Flows and Summary Statistics 
We analyze monthly net dollar flows in or out of a fund, using the standard definition in 
the literature of the change in total net assets minus appreciation: 
      Flowit  =  TNAit – TNAit-1 (1 + Rit). 
 This definition of fund flow assumes that flow occurs at the end of the month.  Updated star 
ratings reflect the most recent month’s performance and are available to investors at the 
beginning of the following month.  Thus, if a star change occurs using return data through 
October 1998, we record November 1998 as the month of the star change and designate the flow 
in November as the first possible flow that could be due to the change. 
Panel A of Table I provides summary statistics on monthly flow aggregated over the 
entire sample period for each Morningstar star rating group.  The flow is measured and summed 
across all funds in the same rating group.  Consistent with widely-cited statistics on the 
popularity of four- and five-star funds, these funds attract large dollar flows totaling $349 billion, 
while funds with three-stars or less experience net outflow of $133 billion.  Thus, four- and five-
star funds collectively attract 124.4% of all flow to domestic equity funds.  Notice that unrated 
funds in our sample also receive positive flow.  In fact, unrated funds collectively receive more 
flow than funds rated with three stars or less.  
Figure 1 tells a similar story when the data are analyzed on a disaggregated basis. Figure 
1 plots the mean monthly dollar flow over the sample period in each of five star rating 
categories.  The typical fund with one, two, or three stars experiences $2 million in outflow, 
while the typical four- and five-star fund receives inflows of $6 million and $33 million.  The 
highly convex relation between fund flow and Morningstar rating is consistent with the well-




Tufano (1998).  The resemblance of this figure to others in the literature illustrates the 
importance of identifying a methodology that can disentangle the Morningstar effect from other 
influences on fund flow. 
 
III.  Empirical Approach and Methodology  
  This section describes the details of how we apply event study methods to the context of 
mutual fund flows, and provides summary statistics on the informational events we study. 
A.  Frequency of Star Rating Change Events  
Panels B and C of Table 1 provide sample summary statistics on the frequency of star 
rating change events.  Panel B reports the frequency count of funds receiving an initial star rating 
upon their third anniversary as a fund, which is a special case of a change in star rating.  We 
identify 1,637 initial star rating events, with a breakdown by initial star rating that closely 
follows that of 10%, 22.5%, 35%, 22.5%, 10% expected under Morningstar’s algorithm.  
Panel C reports the frequency of star rating changes in our sample. We observe 10,735 
rating changes, which represent close to 10% (10,735/111,715) of total fund-months.  The vast 
majority of these changes are upgrades or downgrades of one star.  We do not analyze changes 
greater than one star, which represent less than 1% of all rating changes. 
 
B.            Event study method for calculating abnormal flow 
An event-study allows us to isolate the incremental flow due to the rating change as 
separate from “normal” flow to that fund.  To compute expected, or normal, flow we estimate the 
















t F  is the net dollar flow to fund i at month t and 
i
t SF  is the aggregate net flow to all funds 
in the same style category as fund i at month t, 
i
t RET 1 - is fund i’s return at t-1, and 
i
t F 1 - is the net 
flow to fund i at t-1.  We use nineteen Morningstar-defined style categories to identify each 
fund’s style and to compute aggregate style flows.  The appendix contains details of our 
procedure for constructing these style flow benchmarks.  We define the first month an investor 
would have information available about a new Morningstar rating as event time 0.  To estimate 
the coefficients for the benchmark flow regressions we use 12 months of data, ending 3 months 
before time 0 (i.e., event month -14 to -3).
8   
Using the analogy to a market model for stock returns, appropriate regressors for the 
benchmark model are those expected to both affect all funds and vary over time.  For example, 
the aggregate net flow to a particular style category ( t SF ) is a common factor for all funds in 
that category, and flows to various styles differ substantially over time.  We estimate the 
sensitivity of each fund to the popularity of its style (
i
1 b ) to account for this component of a 
fund’s flow around the event of a rating change. 
We also include fund-specific measures of lagged returns and lagged flow because they 
have been found to influence flow in the cross-section (Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997), Del Guercio and Tkac (2001)).  Benchmark diagnostics indicate a statistical relation 
among a fund’s own raw return performance, its flow, and its flow in the subsequent month.  
Thus, we include these fund-specific measures rather than construct a cross-sectional factor, such 
as the flow “premium” experienced by funds with superior prior performance.  Although cross-
sectional studies also find a relation between flow and fund size, relative fund size (versus other 
                                                                 
8 We find that analyzing a longer estimation period, (-36, -3), indicates that benchmark coefficients are not stable 




funds) does not vary much over time suggesting it has limited applicability as a cross-sectional 
factor. 










t F RET SF F AF 1 3 2 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ - - - - - = b b b a . 
In words, the abnormal flow to fund i at time t equals the actual flow at time t minus the 
expected flow due to aggregate style flow, its lagged return, and lagged flow, minus the average 
abnormal flow to fund i (
i a ˆ ).  This average abnormal flow captures fund-specific determinants 
of flow that do not vary over time.  Note that the sign of abnormal flow does not have the same 
interpretation as net flow.  For example, a negative abnormal flow does not necessarily imply 
that the fund is experiencing outflows.  Rather, it implies that the fund is receiving less flow than 
expected.  Expected, or normal, flow may also be either positive or negative.  For example, a 
fund might simultaneously have high positive normal flow because its style is very popular this 
month or it has a strong performance track record, and negative abnormal flow because of a 
recent rating downgrade.  
Panel D of Table I contains estimation period diagnostics that suggest our benchmark 
model is reliable.  Events appear to be reasonably spread out over the sample period indicating 
that calendar time clustering is not a concern.  The overall fit of the benchmark regressions 
justifies the inclusion of fund-specific lagged return and lagged flow in addition to the aggregate 
style flow factor. Including these three regressors results in a median R
2 across events of 0.34, 
with 25% of these events exhibiting an R
2 of over 0.54.  By comparison, the median R
2 is only 
0.09 when we include only the aggregate style flow factor. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
in the most well-behaved abnormal flows during the estimation period (i.e., average abnormal flows in the months 




Panel D also contains cross-sectional correlations, pooled over all funds and over all 
months in the estimation period, of residual flow with benchmark regressors, as well as of 
predicted (normal) flow with benchmark regressors.  As expected from a well-specified 
benchmark, the cross-sectional correlation between the estimation residuals and the regressors 
are not significantly different from zero.  The negligible positive correlation between the 
residuals and fund size further justifies excluding size as a regressor, and suggests that 
heteroskedasticity of the residuals is unlikely to be a problem.  In contrast, there is a strong 
positive correlation between predicted flows and fund size implying that large funds have higher 
normal flow.
9  Together, these diagnostics indicate that the model does a reasonable job 
accounting for flow that may be related to size, possibly captured by the benchmark’s fund-
specific intercept term.  Overall, we are reasonably confident that the benchmark specification 
accurately accounts for the determinants of flow established by the previous cross-sectional 
literature. 
In our main tests we apply the event study methods described in Dodd and Warner (1983) 
to the context of fund flows.  Specifically, we focus on standardized abnormal flows, where 
event period abnormal flows are standardized by the estimated forecast variance of the normal 
flow.  We also compute cumulative standardized abnormal flows by summing the standardized 
abnormal flows for each fund from event time 0 to t, and then dividing by the square root of the 
number of months used in the cumulation.  Following standard practice, at each event date t we 
compute average standardized abnormal flows (ASTAFt) and average cumulative standardized 
abnormal flows (ACSTAFt) by averaging across N events (funds).  An advantage of analyzing 
standardized abnormal flows is that it prevents funds with large forecast variances (noisy flows) 
                                                                 
9 While the correlation between fund size and normal flow appears small for rating changes relative to the sample of 




from dominating the statistical tests.  Under this method of calculating ASTAF, funds with more 
precisely measured abnormal flows are implicitly weighted more heavily.  
We compute ASTAFt and ACSTAFt over the event window month 0 to +6.  While it 
seems reasonable to test for abnormal flows up to six months after a rating change, the length of 
the event window is somewhat arbitrary.
10  Unlike an event study of returns where market 
efficiency implies an immediate stock price reaction to new information, it is not obvious how 
quickly to expect to see the impact of a rating change on fund flows.  An immediate flow 
reaction to a star change is presumably due to vigilant investors who monitor funds on a monthly 
basis.  Perhaps these investors view star rating changes as a low-cost information update on their 
fund’s recent performance.  A delayed flow response is also plausible either because more casual 
investors take time to respond to the new rating, or because the majority of these investors 
primarily respond to fund advertisements touting the new rating, which take time to place in 
publications.
11 
By grouping funds according to their pre-change star rating, we can calculate the flow 
response due to a change from three to four stars, from four to five stars, etc. and assess these 
measures for statistical significance.  We use the standardized cross-sectional test of Boehmer, 
Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) to assess the statistical significance of event period ASTAFt and 
ACSTAFt.  Specifically, we divide ASTAFt and ACSTAFt by its contemporaneous cross-
sectional standard error.  Thus, the cross-section of events used to compute the mean of the 
standardized abnormal flows is also used to compute the standard error, assuming that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5-star funds). 
10 Given that Morningstar releases ratings within a few business days of month end, event month 6 is technically 
more than six months after a rating change (i.e., six months plus a fractional month).  Nonetheless, we refer to this 
throughout the paper as six months after a rating change for simplicity. 
11 To investigate this we sampled all mutual fund ads featuring domestic equity funds appearing in Money, Barron’s 




standardized abnormal flows are independently and identically distributed.  Because this measure 
uses event-period abnormal flows to calculate the standard errors, it adjusts for any change in the 
variance of the standardized abnormal flow from the estimation period to the event-window.  
This is the most appropriate statistic to use when testing out of sample event-window abnormal 
flows.  Since we do see larger event-window cross-sectional variances, if anything this statistic 
will bias against finding a significant Morningstar effect.  For example, if funds differ widely in 
their response to a change from 5- to 4-stars, this will result in a large cross-sectional standard 
error and lower t-statistic, making it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
flow response.  
We also report statistics on the percentage of funds that experience positive standardized 
abnormal flows for each event date.  Specifically, we report the results of a chi-square test under 
the null hypothesis that 50% of sample funds have positive standardized abnormal flow.  This 
nonparametric test statistic complements the parametric tests by providing information on the 
distribution of standardized abnormal flow.  
 
IV.  Results  
  The primary goal for the first part of our analysis is isolating the Morningstar effect from 
other influences on fund flow.  As a result, we first focus on the standardized abnormal flow 
measures and test statistics described in the previous section, which we find to have the most 
well-behaved statistical properties for testing the null hypothesis of zero abnormal flow response.  
The focus on standardized measures, however, does not lend itself to straightforward 
interpretations of abnormal flow in magnitudes like millions of dollars.  To avoid any confusion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
report a star rating, only 10% use the most recent rating (as of May 1999) while 32% use a one-month old rating and 




across standardized and non-standardized measures of abnormal flow, we address the economic 
significance of the Morningstar effect in separate sub-sections.   
  We report results based on the full sample of funds experiencing a rating change, 
including those that undergo a subsequent change within the six-month event window.  Thus, 
estimates of average abnormal flow represent the unconditional Morningstar effect, equivalent to 
the ex-ante expected value of a Morningstar rating change.  This is the most appropriate sample 
to study because investors cannot know in advance whether a rating will change again.  We also 
analyze screened samples of funds that do not experience any further rating changes in the 
subsequent six months as a robustness check.  The results and inferences are qualitatively the 
same and so are not reported here.  We do, however, report the results of some analysis on a 
screened sample in section C. 
 
A.  Abnormal Flow Response to Initial Morningstar Star Ratings 
We begin our analysis by measuring the impact on flow of a fund being rated by 
Morningstar for the very first time.  This event is perhaps the most straightforward to study 
because all funds share the common status of being an unrated, three-year old fund.  Table II, 
panel A reports the average standardized abnormal flow (ASTAF) for each event month from 0 
to 6, in five initial Morningstar star rating subsamples.  To minimize the possibility that extreme 
observations drive the results, we delete the top and bottom 1% of standardized abnormal flows 
at each event date in each rating subsample throughout our analysis.  
It is clear from panel A that a 5-star initiation is an unambiguously positive event for 
funds.  The ASTAF are significantly positive in each of the six months following a 5-star 
initiation.  The results of 




abnormal flows equals 50% are also consistent with this interpretation.  The percentage positive 
exceeds 50% for most event dates for 5-star funds, significantly so in event months 1 (67%) and 
6 (60%).  In contrast, the ASTAF and the percentage positive are only significant in one or two 
months out of the event window for the other initiation subsamples, and it is often the case that 
the inference is different across the parametric and non-parametric (
2 c ) tests for the same event 
date.  We find only weak evidence that a 2-star initiation is a negative event and a 4-star 
initiation is a positive event.   
Table II, panel B presents the average cumulative standardized abnormal flow (ACSTAF) 
for event month 0 to 6.  Overall, the results are consistent with our inferences based on Panel A.  
The results are strongly significant for all event months, and the parametric and non-parametric 
tests are completely consistent, only for 5-star initiations.  The cumulative response appears to be 
more strongly negative for 2-star initiations than the month-by-month response revealed in Panel 
A.  This panel also shows a 4-star initiation to be a positive event for the average fund in this 
category; ACSTAF are significant at conventional levels in each event month, consistent with 
funds receiving a modest boost in flow upon receiving an initial 4-star rating.  
 
A.1. Is the Initial Star Effect Driven by an Initial Jensen’s Alpha Effect? 
Rating initiations are unique in that they represent an opportunity to study the 
simultaneous release of two completely new pieces of fund quality information to investors.  
Morningstar provides an initial one-factor Jensen’s alpha and an initial star rating simultaneously 
at the time of a fund’s 36-month anniversary.  An obvious question is whether the flow response 
documented in Table II is due to the Morningstar star rating or the new alpha information.  To 




various groupings of funds based on ranking by Jensen’s alpha.  In a sense, we create a simulated 
initial alpha rating. 
Table III contains the test results comparing the ability of the initial alpha rating to 
explain variation in abnormal flow against the ability of the initial Morningstar star rating.  
Specifically, Table III reports the results of a two-way analysis of variance of six-month 
cumulative standardized abnormal flows following a fund’s 36-month anniversary.  We examine 
three alternative definitions of alpha groups: equal-sized quartiles, equal-sized quintiles, and 
“Morningstar-type” quintiles where the top 10% of alphas are in quintile 5, the next 22.5% in 
quintile 4, the next 35% in quintile 3, the next 22.5% in quintile 2, and the bottom 10% in 
quintile 1.  Each alpha grouping represents a different method that investors might use to 
translate alpha onto a coarser grid of fund quality.  
The Type II sum of squares tests indicate that conditional on the power of Morningstar 
star rating, none of the alpha categorizations has the power to explain cross-sectional variation in 
abnormal flows.  Under each of the three definitions, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
average abnormal flows are equivalent across alpha groups.  Thus, at least among these three 
plausible uses, an initial alpha does not appear to influence investor behavior. 
At the same time, Morningstar star rating remains significant conditional on any of the 
alpha categorizations.  When funds are in “Morningstar-type” alpha quintiles, we can reject the 
null hypothesis that Morningstar star rating does not matter (i.e., that average abnormal flows are 
the same across all star ratings) at the 1% confidence level.  Therefore, the results of Table II 
appear to be robust and not driven by the simultaneous release of alpha information.  We 
investigate this further, including consideration of continuous measures of initial alpha, in 




A.2.  Assessment of the Economic Significance of the Morningstar Effect of Rating Initiations 
Having established the statistical significance of the Morningstar effect on fund flows, we 
now examine the issue of economic significance.  For example, one question of interest is how 
many millions of dollars an initial 5-star rating is worth to the average fund.  To answer such 
questions, we analyze non-standardized abnormal dollar flow, rather than the standardized 
version used in the statistical tests.  Non-standardized abnormal flow has the additional 
advantage of being in the same units as normal flow, which aids in drawing comparisons.  
Figure 2 graphs the average normal and average abnormal flows cumulated over the 6 
months following an initial star rating in each of the five star categories.  This figure highlights 
the success of our benchmark methodology in capturing the higher normal flow typical in funds 
with strong performance track records.  The convex relation, whereby 5-star funds have much 
higher normal flow than the other categories, parallels that found for total flows in the cross-
sectional fund flow literature.  This pattern of normal flow provides additional evidence that our 
technique isolates the incremental flow due to the star rating, over and above the flow due to a 
fund’s performance history.  
The pattern of abnormal flows shown in Figure 2 largely mirror the standardized 
abnormal flow results of Table II, but now we can interpret our findings in units of millions of 
dollars.  The strong 5-star initiation response results in $25.7 million in abnormal flow over the 
following 6 months, which represents an impressive 53% increase above normal expected flow.  
The only difference from the Table II results is that average abnormal flow following an initial 4-
star rating is negative in Figure 2, while its standardized version is positive in Table II.  This is 




standardized average abnormal flow below zero.  This supports our earlier inference that only a 
five-star initiation is an unambiguously positive event. 
Although it is much less obvious in the figure, an initial Morningstar rating appears to 
have a dramatic effect on 2-star funds as well.  In contrast to the sizable normal flow typical of 5-
star funds, funds with initial 2-star ratings have much more modest average normal flow of $4.5 
million.  However, the negative average abnormal flow following a 2-star initiation of -$5.9 




A.3.  Investor Behavior Consistent with Abnormal Flow upon Initiations  
 
Our main results so far indicate that an initial Morningstar rating is a significant event in 
the life of many funds.  It appears that a fund must receive a 5-star rating before it will attract 
additional investor assets above its normal flow as an unrated fund.  This result is reminiscent of 
the disproportionate flows accruing to “winning” funds documented by Sirri and Tufano (1998) 
and others.  The key difference here is that it is not the performance per se that drives the 
additional flow, but the packaging of this performance in the form of an easily interpretable star 
rating.  
There is some evidence that a 2-star rating results in significantly less flow and, more 
weakly, that a 4-star rating brings additional assets.  For 1- and 3-star funds, however, a rating 
initiation is almost certainly a non-event.  These results are consistent with investors who view 
fund allocation as a tournament in which only 5-star funds are the winners.  This view is 
supported by the existence of financial advisor “select lists” that often screen out unrated funds 
and funds with less than a 5-star rating.  Another influence might arise from corporate officials 




favor 5-star funds out of a desire to fulfill their fiduciary responsibility by offering only the best 
available funds, or by a need to have the validation and certification that a top Morningstar rating 
offers.  Finally, funds are probably more likely to advertise if they have a 5-star rating to tout, 
which should further boost the flow of this elite group.
12   For example, Jain and Wu (2000) find 
that mutual funds advertised in Barron’s or Money magazine have significantly higher flows 
than a control sample after controlling for fund performance.  A combination of these factors 
might explain why an initial 5-star rating is uniquely capable of opening up a wider market of 
potential investors. 
It is worth mentioning that being rated by Morningstar does not per se, produce abnormal 
flow as a fund moves from unrated to rated status.  Thus, our results are inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that investors perceive rated funds to be superior, possibly because they have reached 
the three-year milestone and receive some certification by Morningstar.  The results in Table II 
confirm the insight suggested by the summary statistics in Table I that non-rated funds generate 
more flow on average than 1-, 2- and 3-star funds.  Overall, the initiation results imply that 
Morningstar ratings overall do not have “marquee” value in and of themselves, but that a 5-star 
rating does.  
 
B. Abnormal Flow Response to Star Rating Changes 
Initiations are merely a special case of the more frequent occurrence of a change in 
Morningstar rating.  This section presents results using the same methodology for over 10,000 
monthly star rating changes during the 1996 to 1999 period.  In contrast to rating initiations that 
occur only once in the life of a fund, this sample is more representative of the Morningstar effect 
                                                                 
12 We find that of the 33 distinct funds that advertised a Morningstar rating in Barron’s, Money Magazine, or the 




across the entire universe of domestic equity funds.  Using the full population of rating changes 
also allows us to more readily relate our findings based on the time-series to those of the cross-
sectional literature. 
As in our tests of initial ratings, a zero abnormal flow response in the six-months 
following a change in star rating is the null hypothesis.  Table IV contains the results of the tests 
of this hypothesis. Specifically, panels A and B contain the ASTAF analysis for all rating 
upgrades and downgrades, while panels C and D contain the average cumulative standardized 
abnormal flow (ACSTAF) results.  Abnormal flow in this context can be interpreted as a fund’s 
actual flow relative to that expected if it had maintained its original star rating.  Most event 
months show significant ASTAF and ACSTAF in the expected direction, namely positive for 
rating upgrades and negative for rating downgrades.  In addition, 
2 c tests generally confirm the 
inferences from the parametric tests, and suggest that rating changes are significant events. 
There are two exceptions to the general result that upgrades are followed by positive 
abnormal flow and downgrades are followed by negative abnormal flow.  Upgrades from 1- to 2-
stars have only weak evidence of a positive flow response.  This might not be surprising because 
these funds still remain near the bottom of the performance distribution.  More surprising is the 
result that downgrades from 5- to 4-stars are associated with positive ASTAF and ACSTAF, 
instead of the expected negative.  However, while the average response is positive, the 
2 c  test 
suggests that the median response is not different from zero.  As we discuss in section C, this 
mixed response might be driven by reversals by some of these downgraded funds back up to 5-
stars. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 




Comparing the Table IV results for rating changes with those of Table II for initiations 
confirms that attainment of 5-star status stands out as an overwhelmingly positive event for 
funds.  All test statistics are highly significant in every month in both panels and the magnitude 
of the response is over twice that for any other rating change category.  An interesting contrast to 
the results for initiations, however, is the evidence here that ratings other than 5-stars matter.  A 
decrease from 3- to 2-stars, and especially from 4- to 3-stars, implies significantly less flow for 
the average fund in these groups.  We also find that upgrades from 2- to 3-stars, and 3- to 4-stars 
have positive value in generating abnormal flow. 
 
B.1.  Assessment of the Economic Significance of the Morningstar Effect of Rating Changes 
Figure 3 graphs the non-standardized average normal and average abnormal flows 
cumulated through the 6 months following a change in star rating in each of the eight rating 
upgrade and downgrade categories.  Much like the pattern of normal flows for initiations in 
Figure 2, better performing funds have higher normal flows across the downgrade and upgrade 
categories.  Specifically, Figure 3 shows that 1- and 2-star funds experience outflows on average 
while the best performing funds experience large inflows.  The figure also suggests that the 
benchmark reliably captures the flow resulting from the performance that led to an upgrade or 
downgrade.  For example, comparing funds that both upgraded and downgraded from a previous 
rating of 4-stars, suggests that the average normal flow can be quite different for funds at the 
same pre-change rating ($-6 versus $124 million).  
Similar to the result for rating initiations, achieving 5-star status is a meaningful event for 
a fund.  We find that an upgrade from 4- to 5-stars results in $44 million in abnormal flow, or 




5- to 4-stars, on the other hand, results in a loss of only $8 million in abnormal flow.  Comparing 
these estimates to that of representative cross-sectional results summarized in Figure 1, 
highlights the value-added of partitioning flow into normal and abnormal components. 
For example, using the average monthly flow estimates from Figure 1 for 4-star funds 
versus 5-star funds implies that there is a $26 million ($32-$6) difference in average monthly 
flow.
13  This cross-sectional relation therefore predicts that an upgrade from 4- to 5-stars would 
result in an average of  $182 million of additional flow over the seven months following this 
rating change ($26 million per month*7 months).  The analogous prediction for a downgrade 
from 5- to 4-stars is a $182 million decrease in flow on average.  Our findings suggest that the 
prediction based on a cross-sectional analysis grossly overestimates the average response to a 
rating change, and most certainly overestimates an isolated Morningstar effect.   Furthermore, 
while predictions based on a cross-section always imply a symmetric flow response to upgrades 
and downgrades, we find an asymmetric flow response to an upgrade and downgrade from 4- to 
5-stars. 
Figure 3 shows that the abnormal dollar flows following rating changes are relatively 
small in magnitude.  However, the abnormal flow is economically significant when measured as 
a percentage of normal flow, ranging from 15-34%.  Moreover, in the case of a downgrade from 
4- to 3-stars, the magnitude of abnormal flow (-$14.9 million) exceeds the normal flow expected 
for these funds (-$6 million).  Overall, we conclude that monthly Morningstar rating changes are, 
on average, significant economic events for domestic equity mutual funds. We also contend that 
                                                                 
13 While Figure 1 is a univariate illustration of the cross-sectional relation between flow and Morningstar rating, it 
closely mirrors a more sophisticated multivariate analysis. For example, we ran various cross-sectional regressions 
of monthly dollar flow on return quintile dummies, lagged flow, fund size, Morningstar dummies, and assorted 
interaction terms on our full sample of funds. The difference between the coefficients on the 4- and 5-star dummies 
ranges from $22 to $28 million in various specifications, which is very close to the $26 million from the univariate 
analysis.  Thus, in discussing the marginal impact of Morningstar star ratings we use the more straightforward, but 




an event study is better suited to isolating the flow due to the change in star rating than a 
multivariate cross-sectional specification.  
 
B.2. Investor Behavior Consistent with Abnormal Flow upon Star Rating Changes  
The findings from our monthly time-series analysis on rating changes provide some new 
insights about how mutual fund investors make investment decisions.  We find economically and 
statistically significant positive responses to rating upgrades, and negative responses to rating 
downgrades.  Moreover, most of these flow responses are significant beginning in event month 
0, indicating that investor response is detectable at the same monthly frequency that Morningstar 
releases new information.  This is consistent with anecdotal evidence from an official at 
Morningstar that traffic on their website spikes on the days surrounding the release of new 
ratings. 
These results imply that some investors vigilantly monitor rating information and, given 
that our method accounts for other influences on fund flow, view the rating change as “new” 
information on fund quality.  This is somewhat surprising given that the rating change reflects 
just one additional rolling month of fund performance and that a great deal of information is 
already available to investors on these more seasoned funds.  
Another insight from our analysis is the asymmetry in the response to an upgrade to 5-
star status compared to a fall from this position.  While a 5-star rating is extremely valuable in 
generating abnormal flow, the results indicate that a downgrade to 4-stars is at worst a mildly 
negative event.  We conjecture that the same forces behind the strong 5-star initiation effect 
discussed earlier, namely advertising and 401k recommended lists, might be operating here as 




downgrades to 4-stars only reach investors who actively monitor ratings on their own.  Similarly, 
perhaps funds are added to 401k plan options and recommended lists upon reaching 5-star status, 
but are only removed from these lists if performance lags either more dramatically or 
permanently.  Alternatively, a tax lock-in effect might contribute to the asymmetric response if 
investors are reluctant to liquidate downgraded funds in order to avoid realizing taxable gains, 
which might be potentially large in former 5-star funds.
14  
Finally, we note some differences between the results on rating changes and those for 
initiations.  While we did not find a flow response for 1-, 3- and 4-star rating initiations, we do 
find one for upgrades and downgrades into these categories, suggesting that investors view the 
information content of these two events differently.  Perhaps the significant response to rating 
changes reflects an investor perception concerning performance persistence.  For example, a 
flow response to downgrades is consistent with a pool of investors who believe that this 
information signals continued deterioration in future performance.  Whatever the reason behind 




C. Cross-sectional Regressions of the Determinants of Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Flow 
In this section, we test whether the Morningstar effect we identify in Tables II and IV is 
driven by other factors, such as fund performance in the event window, or fund-specific 
characteristics such as age.  If we succeeded in isolating the Morningstar effect, we should find 
that star ratings explain variation in six-month cumulative standardized abnormal flows 
(CSTAF6) after controlling for event-period performance and other fund characteristics. 
                                                                 




Table V Panel A contains the results of a multivariate regression of CSTAF6 on initial 
star rating dummies, four additional performance measures, and fund-specific variables.  We 
estimate the regression separately for the full sample of all rating initiations with the necessary 
data (n=1101), and for a screened sample where we delete all funds that undergo a rating change 
during the six-month event window (n=564).  The screened sample allows for a check of the 
robustness of the results to the deletion of potentially confounding events.  
The first performance measure, initial Jensen’s alpha measured as a continuous variable, 
represents fund quality information that is released simultaneously with the initial star rating.  Its 
t-statistic thus represents a test in the spirit of the simulated alpha-events in Section IV.A.1.  The 
other three performance measures represent new information during the event window: the 
change in alpha, the change in star rating, and the compounded return, all from time 0 to 5.  
Event-window performance could potentially confound the observed cumulative abnormal flow 
effect if, say, 5-star funds continue to improve in performance over the six-month period and the 
benchmark is not predicting the entire flow response to this performance.  
We investigate several fund characteristics that may influence investor choices. First, we 
include a no-load dummy, the expense ratio, and the 12b-1 expense ratio.  Funds with higher 
12b-1 fees are presumably marketed more aggressively and so may experience higher flows.  We 
include a year-end dummy equal to one if the rating change or initiation event occurred in 
December or January to check for a seasonal effect around the turn of the year when, 
anecdotally, most investors evaluate their investments.  We include fund size and age because 
they have been found to explain flows in the cross-sectional literature.  We include age only for 
rating change events because funds are all the same age upon rating initiations.  Finally, we 




same Morningstar style and star-rating category.  This measure should only be important if 
investors use star ratings in their decision-making.  For example, if investors choosing among 
potential funds first decide on a style category and star rating, and then choose a fund from this 
group, this variable would have a negative and significant coefficient. 
In both the full and screened samples we see the strong 5-star effect documented earlier. 
The statistically significant coefficients indicate that funds with initial 5-star ratings have 
significantly higher flow than other initial rating categories.  Jensen’s alpha is not significant in 
either sample, providing more evidence that the abnormal flow is indeed due to the Morningstar 
rating.  In the full sample we find that future star rating changes are significantly positively 
related to abnormal flows.  This is expected given our finding that rating upgrades are associated 
with positive abnormal flow and rating downgrades with negative.  The contemporaneous 
performance measure, the change in alpha over the event window, is not significant once we 
remove funds that change star rating during the event window. 
Contemporaneous raw return, however, is significantly related to abnormal flows.  
Because our procedure takes event-period returns explicitly into account in computing abnormal 
flows, this may be evidence that the benchmark relation between flow and performance is not 
stable from the estimation- to event-period.  One interpretation of this stylized fact is that an 
initial star rating is truly an event in the life of a fund, perhaps marking a fundamental change for 
the fund.  
Turning to the fund characteristics, none of the coefficients are significantly different 
from zero in both samples except for the number of competitors with the same star rating and 




close-substitute funds implies lower abnormal flow.  Overall, we conclude that the 5-star 
initiation effect is robust to the inclusion of other performance measures and characteristics.  
Table V Panel B reports the analogous results for rating changes. The only difference 
from the earlier specification is that we exclude the alpha at the time of the rating change 
because it is not a new piece of information.
15  Consistent with our earlier analysis, coefficients 
on dummy variables for rating upgrades and downgrades are almost all significantly different 
from zero in the expected direction.   
The full sample results indicate that the puzzling positive abnormal flows following a 
downgrade from 5 to 4 stars appears here as well.  In the screened sample, however, the 
coefficient on the 5- to 4-star downgrade dummy is negative but insignificant.  This suggests that 
the positive abnormal flows in Table IV are driven by funds that downgrade to 4-stars, but then 
quickly return to 5-star status within the event window.  The insignificance of the negative 
abnormal flow suggests that investors do not view a downgrade from 5 to 4 stars as a reason to 
either stop investing in a fund or to pull money out of a fund.  One interpretation is that four-star 
funds are still considered “good” funds, consistent with them being in the top third of all funds.   
Similar to the initiations analysis, contemporaneous raw return has some explanatory 
power but alpha changes do not.  The number of competitor funds is significant in the full 
sample, but not the screened sample perhaps indicating a somewhat weaker relation among these 
older funds.  Of the other fund characteristics, only fund size and the end of the year dummy are 
significantly related to abnormal flow.  The coefficient on fund size is actually negative, 
indicating that larger funds have lower average abnormal flows, controlling for the other 
                                                                 
15 In the case of initiations we had two new pieces of competing fund quality information released simultaneously. 
In the case of rating changes, it is not at all obvious what the competing fund quality information is. Given that alpha 
is a continuous variable, there are innumerable ways to define an alpha change, or to test the significance of a 




variables in the regression.  The positive coefficient on the year-end dummy is consistent with 
greater allocation activity at year-end.  
 
 
V.  Conclusion  
Using the natural experiments of star rating initiations and rating changes, we analyze the 
effect Morningstar has on the allocation of investment capital by investors.  We find that, among 
previously unrated funds, the initiation of a 5-star rating delivers $26 million, or 53% above 
normal expected flow, to the average fund achieving such a status.  Similarly, being upgraded 
from 4- to 5-stars results in $44 million in abnormal flow, or 35% above normal expected flow.  
We argue that this might reflect the unique ability of a 5-star rating to attract new assets to a 
fund.   
While most rating changes show significant abnormal flows in the expected direction, 
namely positive for rating upgrades and negative for rating downgrades, this is not the case for 
all rating initiation categories.  For example, we find significant abnormal flows for a fund being 
downgraded to 3-stars or upgraded to 4-stars, yet an initial rating in these categories appears to 
be a non-event.  This inconsistency between the response to changes and initiations leads us to 
conclude that the presence of a previous rating materially affects aggregate investor reallocation 
decisions.   
One possible explanation is that the profile of the pool of investors generating the flow 
response is different for unrated versus rated funds.  For example, new investors choosing among 
many potential funds might be behind the observed flow response to an initial rating, whereas the 
flow response to rating upgrades and downgrades might be primarily driven by current investors 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
change events analogous to those in Table III for initiations is therefore beyond the scope of this paper. Given our 




in those funds who reallocate assets based on the update of information.  Another possibility is 
that the pool of investors is the same, but that initial information on fund quality is assessed 
differently than information on marginal changes in quality.  Further study is required to better 
understand the apparently complicated role that fund information plays in investor decision-
making.  
In a similar vein, we interpret significant flow responses as evidence that investors view 
rating changes as valuable new information on fund quality, but we have not explored under 
what conditions these responses can be interpreted as optimal.  The previous literature on mutual 
fund persistence in general, and the ability of Morningstar star ratings to predict future 
performance provides some rationale for such behavior, but more research on this question is 
warranted.
16 
The economically and statistically significant Morningstar effect on fund flow that we 
identify supports the motivations in Blume (1998), Sharpe (1998), and Morey (2000).  These 
studies scrutinize Morningstar’s rating algorithm and identify systematic biases against load 
funds, sector funds, and younger funds implicit in their rating system.  Our findings on the dollar 
value of a 5-star rating adds to this literature by quantifying the opportunity cost to a fund of 
being less likely to receive a 5-star rating. 
Finally, our finding that investors reallocate an economically significant amount of assets 
in response to monthly information releases, and that a loss from a downgrade from 5- to 4-stars 
is not nearly as large as the gain from an upgrade from 4- to 5-stars, suggest possible extensions 
to current tests of managerial incentives and behavior.  Central to these tests are the assumptions 
regarding the rules of the tournament being engaged in by portfolio managers.  Our results 
                                                                 
16 See Blake and Morey (2000) for evidence on the predictive power of star ratings and Brown and Goetzmann 




indicate that insight might be gained from analyzing monthly, rather than annual, tournaments, 
and ones in which the rewards and penalties for changes in performance are asymmetric at 
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Morningstar Style Categories and the Construction of Style Benchmarks 
 
We use Morningstar’s style category as a style identifier for sample funds. Morningstar 
divides the domestic equity star rating category peer group into nineteen mutually exclusive 
categories. We list the nineteen categories in the table below. For each fund in our sample, we 
assign it to the category Morningstar places it in as of October 1999. (For dead funds we use the 
Morningstar category reported in the month before its disappearance). This procedure should 
result in an accurate categorization since according to Morningstar’s definition, the style 
category assignment is based on the fund’s average investment style over the previous three 
years. At each point in time, Morningstar assigns a fund to a style category based on the style 
and size of the stocks the fund owns.  
The style flow we use in our benchmarking procedure is an in-sample measure, using all 
funds in the sample within the same Morningstar category. Thus, large-cap growth funds are 
benchmarked using their sensitivity to the overall flow to large-cap growth funds.  Because our 
sample is constructed to include all domestic equity funds that were rated at any time during the 
sample period, the only funds missing from the aggregate style flow measure are funds coming 
into existence after November 1996 (and thus not rated by Morningstar throughout our sample 






Large-cap growth  376 
Large-cap blend  552 
Large-cap value  406 
Medium-cap growth  279 
Medium-cap blend  168 
Medium-cap value  147 
Small-cap growth  246 
Small-cap blend  132 
Small-cap value  123 
Specialty-Health  30 
Specialty-Technology  51 
Specialty-Utilities  83 
Specialty-Communications  16 
Specialty-Financials  25 
Specialty-Real Estate  59 
Specialty-Natural Resources  43 
Specialty-Precious Metals  40 
Convertible Bond  47 
Domestic Hybrid  564 
 Table I. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Summary Statistics on Mutual Fund Flow by Morningstar Star Rating 
Category 
This panel contains the total dollar flow to mutual funds in six Morningstar star rating categories. The 
sample includes all funds in Morningstar’s domestic equity star rating category over the period November 
1996 through October 1999. In addition to the diversified equity funds that Morningstar assigns to one of 
nine equity styles (e.g, large-cap growth), this category also includes sector funds, convertible bond funds, 
and domestic hybrid funds (e.g., asset allocation funds).  The sample contains flow data for a total of 
111,715 fund-months and includes data for 3,388 unique funds.  For these aggregate flow calculations, and 
in our empirical tests, we delete 220 fund-months that coincide with a fund merger. Fund-months appear in 
the not rated category if they are less than three years old during the month we measure flows, and 
therefore not yet rated by Morningstar. We only include unrated fund-months if the fund receives a rating 









Percent of Total 
Flow to Category 
        1  8,564  -20,497  -7.2 
                2  19,403  -57,106  -20.3 
                3  29,849  -55,714  -19.8 
                4  19,233  111,126  39.6 
                5  7,285  238,141  84.8 
                Not rated  27,381  64,998  23.1 
                Total  111,715  280,949  100 
 Table I. Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Panel B. Frequency of Funds Receiving an Initial Star Rating from Morningstar  
This panel reports the frequency count of funds receiving a Morningstar star rating for the very first time 
over the period November 1996 to October 1999. Receiving an initial rating coincides with the fund turning 











      1  161  9.8 
      2  394  24.1 
      3  588  35.9 
      4  317  19.4 
      5  177  10.8 
      Total  1,637  100 
 
Panel C. Frequency of Fund-Months with Changes in Morningstar Star Rating  
This panel reports the frequency count of fund-months where the fund’s Morningstar star rating is different 
from its previous month’s star rating over the period November 1996 to October 1999.  These star rating 
changes are divided into one-star rating upgrades (i.e., a change from one to two stars), and one-star rating 
downgrades.  We also report the frequency of rating changes greater than one-star (e.g., a change from one 










      1  N/A   739 
      2  653   1,678 
      3  1,588   2,065 
      4  2,053  931 
      5  944   N/A  
      Subtotal   5,238  5,413 
            Total number of 




      Upgrades greater 
than one-star 
40   
      Downgrades greater 
than one-star 
44   
      Total star rating 
changes 
10,735   
 Table I. Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Panel D. Estimation period Statistics of the Event-study Methodology 
This panel reports diagnostic statistics on the event study benchmark model used to calculate abnormal flow for star rating initiation and changes in star rating 
events. The benchmark model, analogous to a market model regression, regresses a fund’s monthly flow on aggregate flow at time t to funds in its same style 
group, its own time t-1 flow, and its own time t-1 return.  We separately fit this benchmark for each of the 11,858 rating initiation or rating change events, and 
define the estimation period as months (-14,-3).  The pairwise cross-sectional correlations reported in the table are computed by pooling observations over all 
funds and months in the estimation period.  The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. 
 
  Star rating initiations  Star rating changes 
  25th  Median  75th  percentile  25th  Median  75th  percentile 















                 
R
2  0.19  0.34  0.54    0.19  0.34  0.54   
                 
                 




Star rating initiations 
 
Star rating changes 
















                 
Standardized 
residuals  
0.002  0.0004  -0.003  0.012
*  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.003 























 Table II. Initial Morningstar Star Ratings of Domestic Equity Funds 
Panel A. Average Standardized Abnormal Flow  
Average standardized abnormal flow (ASTAFt) reported below is averaged across domestic equity funds within the same initial star-rating group. Morningstar 
assigns an initial star rating in the 36
th month of a fund’s existence.  We define standardized abnormal flow in month t as the actual dollar flow in month t minus 
the normal, or expected, flow standardized by the estimated forecast variance of the normal flow. Normal flow is based on a market-model regression whereby a 
fund’s monthly flow is regressed on aggregate flow at time t to funds in its same style group, its time t-1 flow, and its time t-1 return. We use nineteen 
Morningstar-defined style categories to compute aggregate style flows. See the appendix for details on the style categories we use. The estimation period for 
computing the market-model parameters is months (-14,-3). The standard error is equal to the cross-sectional standard deviation over N sample events of the 
standardized abnormal flows, divided by the square root of N.  ASTAFt significantly different from zero at the 5% level or higher in a two-tailed test are 
indicated in bold.  For each event date, we also report the percentage of sample events with positive standardized abnormal flows.  We indicate in bold the 
percentage positive that differs from 50% at the 5% significance level or better, using a chi-square test with one degree of freedom. The number of observations 
differs from Panel B of Table I because we delete fund-months that coincide with mergers, observations that do not have the data necessary to compute flows, 
and the top and bottom 1% of standardized abnormal flows at each event date. 
 
   One-star  (n=136)  Two-stars  (n=330)  Three-stars  (n=496)  Four-stars  (n=261)  Five-stars  (n=147)  Event-
month  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0 
                                0  0.28  1.59  56.2  -0.25  -2.30  43.7  -0.03  -0.36  46.2  0.38  1.93  47.7  0.56  1.99  57.1 
1  -0.08  -0.41  45.9  -0.13  -1.10  44.4  0.03  0.33  48.4  0.32  2.40  52.3  1.13  4.70  66.7 
2  -0.09  -0.54  41.9  -0.19  -1.64  37.1  0.09  0.82  48.6  -0.01  -0.07  49.2  0.86  2.64  56.2 
3  0.15  0.72  52.4  -0.06  -0.55  43.6  0.05  0.46  49.3  0.21  1.55  51.2  0.92  2.64  55.3 
4  -0.12  -0.60  51.6  -0.08  -0.66  46.5  -0.18  -1.56  43.3  0.17  0.97  50.0  0.82  2.21  52.5 
5  -0.05  -0.22  49.6  -0.02  -0.15  48.9  -0.12  -1.04  42.4  0.31  1.82  50.9  0.60  2.32  50.9 
6  0.70  2.01  58.6  -0.10  -0.58  42.4  -0.15  -1.09  40.3  0.30  1.47  49.3  1.27  2.92  60.0 
Panel B. Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Flow  
This panel reports the average cumulative standardized abnormal flow (ACSTAF t) for each date t in the event window.  We first compute the cumulative 
standardized abnormal flow for each fund by summing the standardized abnormal flow from 0 to t, and then dividing by the square root of the number of months 
used in the cumulation.  We then average these over the N sample events to obtain ACSTAF at each event date t.  ACSTAF significantly different from zero in a 
two-tailed test, and the percentage positive different from 50% using a chi-square test with one degree of freedom, both at the 5% significance level or better, are 
indicated in bold.   
 
   One-star  (n=136)  Two-stars  (n=330)  Three-stars  (n=496)  Four-stars  (n=261)  Five-stars  (n=147)  Event-
month  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0 
                                0  0.28  1.59  56.2  -0.25  -2.30  43.7  -0.03  -0.36  46.2  0.38  1.93  47.7  0.56  1.99  57.1 
1  0.11  0.45  50.4  -0.27  -2.21  42.9  0.01  0.11  46.5  0.50  2.74  50.0  1.21  3.90  62.5 
2  -0.10  -0.54  44.2  -0.36  -2.53  38.1  0.05  0.35  46.2  0.45  2.34  51.6  1.50  3.72  61.5 
3  -0.01  -0.06  50.8  -0.34  -2.12  40.9  0.04  0.29  47.3  0.49  2.32  51.7  1.80  3.73  62.6 
4  -0.02  -0.07  48.4  -0.32  -1.78  40.2  -0.10  -0.61  47.2  0.53  2.23  50.4  1.98  3.50  59.2 
5  -0.01  -0.04  47.9  -0.26  -1.28  43.5  -0.13  -0.69  46.8  0.63  2.41  51.8  2.11  3.45  59.8 
6  0.28  0.80  51.7  -0.28  -1.18  41.6  -0.15  -0.71  45.2  0.71  2.28  51.2  2.44  3.57  61.8 
  
Table III. Determinants of the Six-Month Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Flow Response to an Initial Star Rating:  
Initial Jensen’s Alpha versus Initial Morningstar Star Rating 
This table reports the results of a two-way analysis of variance of cumulative standardized abnormal flows from month 0 to 6 (CSTAF 6) for the full sample of 
funds receiving an initial Morningstar star rating (N=1101).  We compare the explanatory power of a fund’s initial Morningstar rating (one to five stars) to a 
fund’s Jensen’s alpha group. We present three ways of defining Jensen’s alpha groups: equal-sized quartiles, equal-sized quintiles, and “Morningstar-type” 
quintiles where the top 10% of alphas are in quintile 5, the next 22.5% in quintile 4, the next 35% in quintile 3, the next 22.5% in quintile 2, and the bottom 10% 
in quintile 1. For each comparison below labeled (1), (2), and (3), we report the F-statistic and the corresponding p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that 
the sample means are identical across groups in the one rating system, conditional on the other rating system. The F test has (n1 – 1, (n1 – 1)(n2 – 1)) degrees of 
freedom, where n1 equals the number of groups in the first rating system and n2 equals the number of groups in the second rating system. For example, the F-
statistic for the test that the mean values of CSTAF6 are identical across Jensen’s alpha quartiles, holding constant the effect of Morningstar star rating, is 1.10 
and the degrees of freedom for this test are (3, 12). The F-statistic for the test that the mean values of CSTAF6 are identical across Morningstar star ratings, 
holding constant the effect of Jensen’s alpha quartiles, is 2.70, with (4,12) degrees of freedom.  The symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 









Type II  





Prob > F 
        Jensen’s alpha quartiles  1.10  0.347 
     
 
(1)  Morningstar star rating groups     2.70
**  0.030 
        Jensen’s alpha quintiles  0.46  0.766 
     
 
(2)  Morningstar star rating groups   2.07
*  0.082 
        Jensen’s alpha “Morningstar-type” quintiles  1.34  0.253 
     
 
(3)  Morningstar star rating groups       3.33













Table IV. Morningstar Star Rating Changes of Domestic Equity Funds 
Panel A. Average Standardized Abnormal Flow for Rating Upgrades  
Average standardized abnormal flow (ASTAFt) reported below is averaged across domestic equity funds within the same star-rating change group. We define 
standardized abnormal flow in month t as the actual dollar flow in month t minus the normal, or expected, flow standardized by the estimated forecast variance of 
the normal flow.  Normal flow is based on a market-model regression whereby a fund’s monthly flow is regressed on aggregate flow at time t to funds in its same 
style group, its time t-1 flow, and its time t-1 return. The estimation period for computing the market-model parameters is months (-14,-3). The standard error is 
equal to the cross-sectional standard deviation over N sample events of the standardized abnormal flows, divided by the square root of N.  Average standardized 
abnormal flows significantly different from zero at the 5% level or higher in a two-tailed test are indicated in bold.  For each event date, we also report the 
percentage of sample events with positive abnormal flows. We indicate in bold the percentage positive that differs from 50% at the 5% significance level or 
better, using a chi-square test with one degree of freedom. The number of observations differs from Panel C of Table I because we delete fund-months that 
coincide with mergers, observations that do not have the data necessary to compute flows, and the top and bottom 1% of standardized abnormal flows at each 
event date. 
 
From 1 to 2-stars  
(n=555) 
From 2 to 3-stars  
(n=1390) 
From 3 to 4-stars  
(n=1770) 




ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0 
                          0  -0.01  -0.13  50.3  0.17  3.15  52.3  0.11  2.26  50.2  0.43  4.86  55.6 
1  0.07  0.91  50.7  0.21  3.44  52.5  0.15  2.98  51.9  0.67  6.95  54.9 
2  0.03  0.34  54.2  0.23  3.65  53.3  0.22  3.86  52.2  0.69  5.73  55.8 
3  0.04  0.52  52.7  0.42  6.08  56.0  0.32  4.90  52.6  0.61  4.49  53.8 
4  0.24  2.92  56.6  0.21  3.03  53.2  0.35  5.18  53.1  0.66  4.67  55.6 
5  0.22  2.15  56.3  0.51  6.53  57.6  0.32  4.41  53.6  0.82  4.83  57.1 
6  0.20  1.84  53.2  0.45  5.15  55.2  0.31  3.93  52.0  0.97  4.46  51.5 
 
Panel B. Average Standardized Abnormal Flow for Rating Downgrades  
 
From 2 to 1-star  
(n=605) 
From 3 to 2-stars  
(n=1437) 
From 4 to 3-stars  
(n=1744) 




ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ASTAFt  t-stat  %>0 
                          0  -0.13  -2.16  48.3  -0.07  -1.39  49.0  -0.07  -1.61  46.8  0.21  2.54  50.2 
1  -0.16  -2.06  48.7  -0.10  -2.08  48.9  -0.13  -2.82  45.8  0.18  2.14  51.5 
2  -0.13  -2.02  47.2  -0.11  -2.26  48.7  -0.15  -3.18  44.7  0.03  0.34  47.3 
3  -0.20  -2.64  49.2  -0.25  -4.78  45.1  -0.16  -2.90  44.8  0.02  0.18  48.0 
4  -0.15  -1.85  47.5  -0.17  -2.80  46.2  -0.17  -2.78  44.3  0.31  2.76  50.5 
5  -0.10  -1.16  47.1  -0.22  -3.61  46.5  -0.20  -3.14  45.1  0.26  1.84  47.7 





Table IV. Morningstar Star Rating Changes of Domestic Equity Funds (continued) 
Panel C. Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Flow for Rating Upgrades 
This panel reports the average cumulative standardized abnormal flow (ACSTAF t) for each date t in the event window. We first compute the cumulative 
standardized abnormal flow for each fund by summing the standardized abnormal flow from 0 to t, and then dividing by the square root of the number of months 
used in the cumulation.  We then average these standardized cumulated abnormal flows over the N sample events in each star-rating change group to obtain 
ACSTAF at each event date t.  ACSTAF significantly different from zero at the 5% level or higher in a two-tailed test are indicated in bold. For each event date, 
we also report the percentage of sample events with positive cumulative standardized abnormal flows. We indicate in bold the percentage positive that differs 
from 50% at the 5% significance level or better, using a chi-square test with one degree of freedom. The number of observations differs from Panel C of Table I 
because we delete fund-months that coincide with mergers, observations that do not have the data necessary to compute flows, and the top and bottom 1% of 
standardized abnormal flows at each event date. 
 
From 1 to 2-stars  
(n=555) 
From 2 to 3-stars  
(n=1390) 
From 3 to 4-stars  
(n=1770) 




month  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0 
                          0  -0.01  -0.13  50.3  0.17  3.15  52.3  0.11  2.26  50.2  0.43  4.86  55.6 
1  0.05  0.63  49.3  0.27  4.16  53.0  0.18  3.15  50.6  0.79  6.97  57.8 
2  0.04  0.45  49.8  0.37  4.82  51.2  0.26  3.77  52.2  1.02  7.07  56.9 
3  0.07  0.70  50.1  0.54  6.16  54.7  0.39  4.67  52.5  1.17  6.67  57.6 
4  0.17  1.48  52.9  0.59  6.07  53.6  0.50  5.23  54.0  1.36  6.60  58.1 
5  0.28  2.19  55.3  0.78  7.10  56.3  0.57  5.36  53.7  1.60  6.66  58.6 
6  0.35  2.37  56.3  0.90  7.24  55.9  0.64  5.36  53.2  1.92  6.78  58.9 
 
Panel D. Average Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Flow for Rating Downgrades  
 
From 2 to 1-star   
(n=605) 
From 3 to 2-stars  
(n=1437) 
From 4 to 3-stars  
(n=1744) 




month  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0  ACSTAFt  t-stat  %>0 
                          0  -0.13  -2.16  48.3  -0.07  -1.39  49.0  -0.07  -1.61  46.8  0.21  2.54  50.2 
1  -0.21  -2.78  48.9  -0.11  -2.09  47.7  -0.14  -2.64  46.5  0.28  2.82  49.9 
2  -0.25  -3.04  46.6  -0.16  -2.70  47.4  -0.20  -3.38  45.1  0.28  2.36  48.6 
3  -0.31  -3.39  45.8  -0.27  -3.93  46.5  -0.26  -3.74  44.3  0.28  1.95  47.9 
4  -0.33  -3.23  45.9  -0.31  -3.95  46.6  -0.33  -4.00  43.8  0.40  2.47  48.7 
5  -0.34  -3.04  46.1  -0.41  -4.63  44.0  -0.42  -4.57  42.5  0.47  2.35  49.7 
6  -0.39  -3.13  46.9  -0.40  -3.99  46.2  -0.47  -4.56  42.7  0.64  2.75  48.4 Table V. Cross-sectional Regressions of Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Flow on 
Event-Window Performance and Fund Characteristics  
Panel A. Initial Star Rating Events 
This panel reports cross-sectional regressions for funds receiving an initial star rating of cumulative standardized 
abnormal flows from month 0 to 6 (CSTAF6) on contemporaneous performance measures and other fund 
characteristics.  We indicate the event timing of the measurement of the contemporaneous performance measures in 
the table. For example, the change in alpha (0, 5) equals the alpha of the fund at month 5 (which uses returns over 
the previous 36 months in its estimation) minus the alpha of the fund at month 0. Return (0,5) is the fund’s 
compounded return from month 0 to 5. The year-end event date dummy equals one if month 0 occurred in 
December or January and zero otherwise. T-statistics are in parentheses and N represents the number of 
observations.  The full sample represents the sample analyzed in Table II and the screened sample is the subsample 
of rating initiations where the fund did not have a rating change during the (0,6) event window. The symbols *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. 
  Full sample  Screened sample 
  CSTAF6  CSTAF6 
Intercept  1.31  -0.88 
  (1.40)  (-0.70) 
      Two star dummy  -0.56
  0.10
 
  (-1.03)  (0.15) 
      Three star dummy  0.21  0.73 
  (0.33)  (0.84) 
      Four star dummy  0.73  1.17 
  (1.04)  (1.27) 
      Five star dummy  1.98
**  3.36
*** 
  (2.41)  (3.25) 
      Initial Jensen’s alpha (t = 0) (%)  0.37
  -0.34
 
  (1.07)  (-0.75) 
      Change in alpha (0,5) (%)  -1.47
***  -1.13
 
  (-2.83)  (-1.60) 
      Change in star rating (0,5)  0.42
*   
  (1.74)   
      Return (0,5) (%)  0.08
***  0.07
*** 
  (6.39)  (3.77) 








      Log of total net assets (t = -1)  -0.17
**  -0.07 
  (-2.20)  (-0.64) 
      Expense ratio (%)  -0.67
*  -0.15 
  (-1.68)  (-0.27) 
      12b-1 ratio (%)  0.73  0.71 
  (1.25)  (0.90) 
      No-load fund dummy  -0.11  0.40 
  (-0.28)  (0.74) 
      Year-end event date dummy  -0.03  0.01 
  (-0.09)  (0.02) 
      Adjusted R-squared  0.075  0.068 
N  1101  564 Table V. Cross-sectional Regressions of Cumulative Standardized Abnormal Flow on 
Event-Window Performance and Fund Characteristics (continued) 
Panel B. Star Rating Change Events 
This table reports cross-sectional regressions for funds experiencing a change in star rating of cumulative 
standardized abnormal flows from month 0 to 6 (CSTAF6) on contemporaneous performance measures and other 
fund characteristics.  We indicate the event timing of the measurement of the contemporaneous performance 
measures in the table. For example, the change in alpha (0, 5) equals the alpha of the fund at month 5 (which uses 
returns over the previous 36 months in its estimation) minus the alpha of the fund at month 0. Return (0,5) is the 
fund’s compounded return from month 0 to 5. The year-end event date dummy equals one if month 0 occurred in 
December or January and zero otherwise. T-statistics are in parentheses and N represents the number of 
observations.  The full sample represents the sample analyzed in Table III and the screened sample is the subsample 
of rating changes where the fund did not have any further rating changes during the (0,6) event window. The 
symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. 
  Full sample  Screened sample 
  CSTAF6  CSTAF6 
Intercept  1.14
***  0.88 
  (2.83)  (0.87) 
      Upgrade (2 to 3 star) dummy  0.79
***  1.47
** 
  (3.20)  (2.44) 
      Upgrade (3 to 4 star) dummy  0.88
***  0.95
 
  (3.61)  (1.58) 
      Upgrade (4 to 5 star) dummy  2.20
***  1.41
** 
  (7.90)  (1.97) 
      Downgrade (2 to 1 star) dummy   -1.05
***  -1.36
** 
  (-3.58)  (-1.92) 
      Downgrade (3 to 2 star) dummy  -0.91
***  -1.80
*** 
  (-3.66)  (-2.95) 
      Downgrade (4 to 3 star) dummy  -0.51
**  -1.30
** 
  (-2.06)  (-2.11) 
      Downgrade (5 to 4 star) dummy  0.71
**  -1.08
 
  (2.54)  (-1.51) 
      Change in alpha (0,5) (%)  0.51
**  0.22
 
  (2.31)  (0.37) 
      Change in star (0,5)  0.56
***   
  (5.88)   
      Return (0,5) (%)  0.01
**  0.04
** 
  (2.18)  (2.43) 





      Log of total net assets (t = -1)  -0.19
***  -0.19
** 
  (-5.88)  (-2.22) 
      Log of fund age  -0.01
  0.15 
  (-0.15)  (0.72) 
      Expense ratio (%)  0.21  -0.30 
  (1.28)  (-0.69) 
      12b-1 ratio (%)  0.18  0.84 
  (0.81)  (1.47) 
       Full sample  Screened sample 
No-load fund dummy  -0.10
  -0.12 
  (-0.77)  (-0.35) 
      Year-end event date dummy  0.11  0.81
** 
  (0.82)  (2.51) 
      Adjusted R-squared  0.057  0.118 
N  7019  1067 
 Figure 1. Average Monthly Dollar Flow in Five Morningstar Star Rating Categories 
To create this plot, we average monthly dollar fund flow for funds with a one through five star rating from 
November 1996 through October 1999. We use all funds in Morningstar’s domestic equity star rating category 















































)Figure 2. Average Six-Month Cumulative Abnormal Flow for Initial Morningstar Star 
Ratings 
To create this plot, we averaged six-month (0,6) cumulative abnormal flow and six-month cumulative normal flow 
across domestic equity funds within the same initial star-rating group. Morningstar assigns an initial star rating in 
the 36
th month of a fund’s existence.  Normal flow is based on a market-model regression whereby a fund’s monthly 
flow is regressed on aggregate flow at time t to funds in its same style group, its time t-1 flow, and its time t-1 
return. Abnormal flow in month t is the actual dollar flow in month t minus normal flow. Note that unlike the 
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Normal flowFigure 3. Average Six-Month Cumulative Abnormal Flow for Morningstar Star Rating 
Changes 
To create this plot, we averaged six-month (0,6) cumulative abnormal flow and six-month cumulative normal flow 
across domestic equity funds within the same star-rating change group. Normal flow is based on a market-model 
regression whereby a fund’s monthly flow is regressed on aggregate flow at time t to funds in its same style group, 
its time t-1 flow, and its time t-1 return. Abnormal flow in month t is the actual dollar flow in month t minus normal 
flow. Note that unlike the numbers reported in Table III, this figure contains measures of abnormal flow that are not 
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